Grassroots Economics

Community Asset Voucher Network

A Kenyan non-profit pioneering Community Asset Vouchers (CAVs) since 2010 — formalized commitments by individuals and businesses for their goods and services, enabling peer-to-peer exchange without reliance on scarce national currency. Operating on the Celo blockchain via the open-source Sarafu.Network platform, it has supported 26,600+ people across 290+ communities with 2,140+ vouchers issued.

Type	Community Asset Voucher Network
Region	Kenya / East Africa
Status	Active
Links	Website Wikipedia GitHub X / Twitter

M69 Score

M69 Alignment3.3

Partially aligned

1.02.03.04.05.0

Monetary Sovereignty3.3

Issuance (3x) + Stability (2x) + Fiat Indep. (2x)

Civilizational Durability2.5

Sovereignty + Governance + Resilience

Universal Adoption3.9

Traction (2x) + Inclusivity

Iss Mod3x

3.8

Stability2x

2.1

Fia Ind & Int2x

3.8

Traction2x

3.7

Sovereignty

2.5

Governance

2.1

Resilience

3.0

Inclusivity

4.2

Scored against the Money2069 Manifesto — see methodology. Higher = more aligned.

Key Findings

Inclusivity is the standout category (4.2/5.0)because the project was purpose-built for financially excluded populations, operates on basic feature phones via USSD with zero cost to join, uses demurrage to structurally prevent wealth concentration, and has demonstrable deployment in refugee camps and urban slums. This is the highest inclusivity score achievable for a real-world deployed system.

Issuance Model scores strongly (3.8/5.0)because commitment-based issuance is genuinely debt-free, directly tied to real economic activity (labor, agriculture, services), and features elastic supply with built-in contraction via demurrage. However, the semi-permissioned issuance process (communities need GE facilitation) prevents a top score.

Governance is the critical weakness (2.1/5.0)because all protocol-level decisions are made by the GE foundation with no formal governance process, no community voting mechanism for platform direction, and no constitutional protections for monetary rules. While individual communities govern their own vouchers, the platform itself is a benevolent dictatorship.

The fundamental tension in the project is between its radical philosophical alignment with M69 values and its centralized operational architecture.The custodial model, single-jurisdiction registration, heavy key-person dependence on Will Ruddick, and grant-funded sustainability model all undermine the sovereignty and durability that the monetary design deserves. The money is well-designed; the infrastructure around it is fragile.

The big takeaway: Grassroots Economics is the most M69-aligned project in its monetary philosophy — debt-free issuance, real-economy backing, local currency composability, anti-concentration mechanisms — but it needs to decentralize its governance and custody, formalize its stability approach, and develop sustainable funding to match its monetary design ambitions.For investors or partners, the question is whether the philosophical alignment and real-world impact track record justify investment in solving the infrastructure gaps.

Detailed Rating Breakdown

Framework v0.2-alpha · Rated 2026-04-12

Grassroots Economics (GE) is a Kenyan non-profit founded in 2010 by Will Ruddick that creates community inclusion currencies (CICs) and community asset vouchers (CAVs) for underserved populations across East Africa. The organization has evolved from paper-based vouchers (Bangla-Pesa, 2013) through feature-phone USSD systems (2017) to blockchain-based tokens on Celo (2023). Its core innovation is "commitment pooling" — communities issue vouchers backed by commitments to provide goods and services, creating a medium of exchange that does not depend on scarce national currency. As of mid-2025, the Sarafu Network has 4,476 active users, 561 unique vouchers, 55 commitment pools, and over 251,000 peer-to-peer exchanges. From an M69 alignment perspective, Grassroots Economics is one of the most philosophically aligned projects in the community currency space. Its issuance model is genuinely debt-free and tied to real economic commitments; its demurrage mechanism prevents hoarding and concentrates value in circulation; and its USSD-based access model serves the world's most financially excluded populations on basic feature phones. The system explicitly supports local currency composability — each community issues its own voucher while pools enable inter-community exchange — making it a living implementation of Commandment 8 ("Global Standard, Local Expression"). However, significant structural limitations constrain the rating. The system is custodial by design (the organization manages keys for users via USSD), governance is centralized in the GE foundation with heavy dependence on founder Will Ruddick, the user base remains small (under 5,000 active users), spending power stability is not explicitly targeted against any benchmark, and the project depends on external grant funding for sustainability. The Sarafu Network demonstrated real resilience during COVID-19 (facilitating over $1M in trade among 30,000 users during lockdowns), but the system's long-term viability depends on continued NGO support and donor funding rather than self-sustaining protocol economics.

Issuance Model3x

3.8

Code	Question	Score
IM-01	Is issuance permissionless?Communities can create their own vouchers via Sarafu.Network, but the process involves GE facilitation and training. Any community group can issue a voucher representing commitments to goods/services, making it semi-open with a rule-based permissioned set of issuers. 220 unique contracts published by individuals and groups. [1][2]	3
IM-02	Is new supply created through debt?Vouchers represent commitments to provide goods and services — not debt. A community group pledges future production (e.g., food forest harvest, labor services) and issues vouchers against that commitment. This is fundamentally debt-free: it is a credit against future production, not a loan that must be repaid with interest. [1][2]	5
IM-03	Is issuance tied to measurable real-world economic activity?Supply is directly linked to real-world economic commitments — communities issue vouchers backed by pledges for specific goods and services (agriculture, construction, care work). Each voucher represents a claim on real economic output. Partially linked because some discretion and human input remains in determining commitment values. [1][2]	4
IM-04	Does the issuance model have a supply cap or hard ceiling?Supply is elastic — it expands as new communities create vouchers and contracts as vouchers expire via demurrage. Each voucher has an expiration rate built into its smart contract. Supply grows with participation and contracts with inactivity. This is elastic with practical bounds. [1][2]	4
IM-05	Can supply contract (burn/redemption) as well as expand?Demurrage (holding fees) automatically reduces balances over time, and voucher expiration contracts supply. Users can also redeem vouchers for the committed goods/services. Contraction is built into the design via demurrage and expiration — it is automatic and on-chain. [1][2]	3

Spending Power Stability2x

2.1

Code	Question	Score
SPS-01	What mechanism does the protocol use to target spending power stability?There is no explicit price-targeting mechanism. However, supply is linked to real economic participation: vouchers are issued against commitments and reduced via demurrage. Supply expands with active participants and contracts with inactivity. This is a reactive mechanism — supply adjusts based on participation thresholds — but it is not continuous or algorithmic in the traditional sense. [1][2]	3
SPS-02	What benchmark is used to measure spending power?Vouchers are nominally pegged to the Kenyan Shilling in practice (e.g., Bangla-Pesa pegged to KES but non-convertible). The supply mechanism ties value to real labor output and economic activity — issuance per active participant plus demurrage. This structurally anchors value to productive capacity, qualifying as a labor-output-linked approach. However, the KES reference introduces moderate inflation exposure. [1][2]	3
SPS-03	How transparent and verifiable is the stability measurement?No formal stability measurement methodology exists. Voucher values are implicitly maintained by community agreement and redemption commitments. There is no published methodology for measuring or verifying spending power stability.	1
SPS-04	What is the protocol's historical deviation from its stability target?No explicit stability target exists to deviate from. Voucher values fluctuate based on community trust and redemption capacity. No data exists on annualized deviation from any benchmark. The system has operated for years but without a measurable stability target, track record cannot be assessed.	1
SPS-05	Does the protocol distinguish between short-term volatility and long-term purchasing power drift?Demurrage addresses long-term purchasing power drift by preventing deflationary hoarding and encouraging circulation. However, there is no explicit short-term volatility dampening mechanism. The system makes an implicit distinction between timescales through demurrage but does not explicitly target both. [1][2]	2
SPS-06	Is the stability mechanism accessible globally?The stability mechanism (activity-linked supply) functions within the Sarafu Network communities, which are primarily in Kenya with some expansion to Cameroon and South Africa. Access is restricted to specific regions and membership groups by design — communities must be onboarded. [1][2]	2

Fiat Independence & Interoperability2x

3.8

Code	Question	Score
FI-01	What is the protocol's unit of account?Each community voucher is its own unit of account, but values are commonly referenced in Kenyan Shilling equivalents. The Bangla-Pesa was "pegged to the Kenyan Shilling but not convertible to it." The system has its own units (each voucher) but bootstraps with fiat reference. [1][2]	3
FI-02	What is the fiat composition of the protocol's collateral or reserves?Vouchers are backed by commitment pools — pledges of real goods and services, not fiat reserves. Some pools accept stablecoin deposits (Celo dollars) for liquidity, but the core backing is non-fiat real-economy commitments. Fiat exposure is minimal and limited to optional liquidity mechanisms. [1][2]	4
FI-03	Does the protocol depend on fiat banking infrastructure to function?The core system operates entirely on-chain via Celo blockchain and USSD. Banking relationships exist for optional fiat on/off-ramps (converting to KES via M-Pesa) but the core protocol runs without them. Users can transact in vouchers without any bank account. [1][2]	4
FI-04	Are the protocol's price feeds and oracles fiat-denominated?The system does not use traditional price feeds or oracles. Voucher values are determined by community agreement and redemption commitments. Pool swap rates are set by liquidity pool mechanics, not oracle feeds. No fiat-denominated price feeds exist because the system does not target a specific price. [1][2]	4
FI-05	What happens to the protocol if the primary fiat currency it references collapses or depegs?If the Kenyan Shilling collapses, the voucher system would continue functioning because backing is in real goods and services commitments, not fiat reserves. The KES reference is for pricing convenience, not structural dependency. Fiat collapse would affect on-ramp liquidity but not core function. [1][2]	4
FI-06	Does the project have a credible transition path from fiat-dominated adoption to fiat-independent operation?The project acknowledges fiat reference pricing but the commitment pooling model is inherently designed for fiat-independence. As communities build trust in voucher systems, fiat reference becomes less necessary. Transition is conceptually defined — commitment pools replace fiat liquidity — but no formal milestone plan exists. [1][2]	3
FI-07	Can local or sectoral currencies be denominated in or settle against this currency?This is a core design feature. Each community issues its own voucher (local currency), and commitment pools enable settlement between different community vouchers. 561 unique vouchers in circulation with 55 pools enabling cross-voucher exchange. Multiple independent local currencies already operate on this standard. [1][2]	5
FI-08	Does the protocol define open standards for interoperability with other monetary systems?The system uses EVM-compatible smart contracts and open-source code (AGPL-3.0). Interoperability with other monetary systems is possible via DEX liquidity pools and standard EVM interfaces. However, no protocol-specific monetary interoperability standard has been published. Interoperability is via generic crypto infrastructure. [1][2]	3

Traction2x

3.7

Code	Question	Score
TR-01	Is the project still active?Fully active and growing. The 2025 survey shows 4,476 active users, 251,449 peer-to-peer exchanges, 561 vouchers, and 55 pools. Active development on GitHub (107 repos, commits as recent as April 2026). New communities onboarding regularly. [1][2]	5
TR-02	How long has the project been in existence?Founded in 2010; 16 years of continuous existence from paper vouchers through digital systems to blockchain. [1]	5
TR-03	How many active users does the project have?4,476 active users as of July 2025 on the current Celo-based system. Historically up to 55,000 users across previous iterations (2020-2021). Current active user count places it in the 1K-10K range. [1][2]	2
TR-04	How many businesses or organizations accept the project's currency?Vouchers are accepted within community networks — over 100 community groups across Kenya with participants including shops, schools, clinics, and cooperative businesses. The system has supported 60,000+ small businesses historically. Current active merchant count is within community networks of 290+ communities. [1][2]	3
TR-05	Is the currency used as a unit of account?Within communities, prices for goods and services are denominated in local voucher units. The 2025 survey shows 30% use Sarafu for buying goods/services and 20% for selling. Communities price goods in voucher terms. However, fiat (KES) denomination still dominates externally. Used as unit of account within defined community networks. [1][2]	4
TR-06	Is the founder or core team still actively working on the project?Will Ruddick remains actively involved as founder and director. He publishes regularly on Substack, speaks at conferences, and leads development. Active team visible through GitHub contributions and publications. [1][2]	5
TR-07	What partner organizations or institutions support or integrate the project?13+ documented partners including BlockScience, Celo, Danish Red Cross, Kenya Red Cross, Rotary International, Community Forge, Commons Stack, Schumacher Center, and academic institutions. Multi-sector partnerships across NGOs, blockchain, research, and humanitarian organizations. [1]	5
TR-08	Is the project covered or recognized by credible external sources?Peer-reviewed research in Nature Scientific Data, Frontiers in Blockchain (RCT study). Major media: Bloomberg, BBC, Al Jazeera, HuffPost, Quartz. Academic coverage from LSE, multiple universities. Policy citations. [1][2][3]	5
TR-09	Is adoption organic — not dependent on subsidies, incentives, or mandates?Mixed. Some adoption is organic — communities use vouchers because national currency is scarce and Sarafu provides genuine utility. The 2025 survey shows 95% find it important for their household. However, initial onboarding involves GE facilitation, Red Cross partnerships for humanitarian distribution, and free token airdrops. Retention appears strong (84% positive income effect) but initial adoption is partially subsidized. [1][2]	3
TR-10	What is the growth trend over the past 12 months?Growth from 3,149 active users (2024) to 4,476 (mid-2025) — approximately 42% growth. Vouchers grew from 239 to 561. Pools from 33 to 55. Moderate growth across all indicators. [1][2]	4
TR-11	Does the project have a coherent narrative and cultural identity that drives long-term commitment?Strong founding narrative rooted in community empowerment, economic sovereignty, and ancient mutual aid traditions (Mweria). Will Ruddick has built a coherent philosophical framework around commitment pooling and economic commons. Community engagement goes beyond financial — 70-74% report improved relationships. Cultural identity connected to ancestral practices. Active community that identifies with the mission. [1][2]	4

Sovereignty

2.5

Code	Question	Score
SO-01	Can any single entity shut down the project?Grassroots Economics Foundation controls critical infrastructure including the custodial key management system, USSD gateway, and Sarafu.Network frontend. While smart contracts on Celo are persistent, the custodial layer and USSD interface are centralized. The GE foundation or Kenyan government could disrupt operations. A single entity could disrupt operations but not permanently destroy the on-chain contracts. [1][2]	3
SO-02	Is the project's core infrastructure permissionless and self-hostable?All software is open-source under AGPL-3.0. 107 GitHub repositories covering the full stack. The software docs emphasize portability and self-hosting. Core protocol is open-source and permissionless. However, it depends on Celo blockchain (permissioned infrastructure in the sense of specific L1). [1][2]	4
SO-03	Is the project subject to the jurisdiction of a single nation-state?GE is registered as a non-profit in Kenya, based in Kilifi. Operations extend to Cameroon and South Africa but are concentrated in Kenya. Regulatory action in Kenya would materially impair the project. [1][2]	2
SO-04	Does the project control or custody user funds?The system uses a custodial key management system — GE manages blockchain wallets on behalf of users, who access them via USSD tied to phone numbers. Users do not hold their own private keys. This is primarily custodial by design, though the open-source nature means the custody code is auditable. [1][2]	2
SO-05	Is the project resilient to key-person risk?Will Ruddick is the founder, public face, primary thought leader, and active director. While the codebase is open-source and there are contributors, Ruddick is central to partnerships, fundraising, strategy, and intellectual leadership. The project is heavily dependent on him. [1][2]	2
SO-06	Does the project depend on any third-party service that could be revoked?Critical dependency on Celo blockchain. Also depends on Safaricom for USSD access (telecom). Celo provides validator stake for gas fee subsidies. Migration path exists (EVM-compatible code can port to other chains) but is not tested. [1][2]	3
SO-07	Can the project be censored — can specific users or transactions be blocked?The custodial model means GE could theoretically block users or transactions. Smart contracts on Celo do not inherently have blacklist functions, but the custodial key management layer gives the operator effective control. Censorship capability exists through the custodial layer but has never been reported as exercised. [1][2]	3
SO-08	Does the protocol protect transaction privacy as a monetary right?Transactions are on the public Celo blockchain — pseudonymous but linkable. The USSD system ties wallets to phone numbers, which GE holds. GE collects user data for research (anonymized for publications). Limited privacy — transaction data is publicly visible and operator collects metadata. [1][2]	2
SO-09	Does the technology enforce the project's monetary rules such that governance cannot silently override them?Smart contracts store token issuer info and expiration rates. Code is open-source and on-chain. However, the custodial key management system and admin roles give the GE team technical capability to modify parameters. Monetary rules are partially on-chain — some critical parameters can be changed by admin roles. [1][2]	3

Governance

2.1

Code	Question	Score
GO-01	How are decisions about the project made?Governance is centralized in the GE foundation. External sources note that "governance is still centralized in the hands of a central team." Decisions about protocol direction, partnerships, and technology are made by the GE team with Will Ruddick leading. Community-level governance exists for individual vouchers but not for the overall protocol. [1][2]	2
GO-02	Who has voting or decision-making power, and how is that power distributed?Decision power is held by the GE foundation board and core team. No token-based voting or formal community governance mechanism for protocol-level decisions. Individual communities govern their own vouchers but have no say in platform direction. [1][2]	2
GO-03	Is the governance process — and the monetary mechanism itself — transparent and publicly auditable?Code is fully open-source (AGPL-3.0, 107 repos). Smart contracts are on-chain and auditable. However, governance deliberation happens internally within the GE team. No public governance proposals, votes, or decision logs. Monetary mechanism is open-source and verifiable but governance process is opaque. [1][2]	3
GO-04	Can governance be captured by a small group or hostile actor?Governance is already concentrated in the GE foundation. There is no token-based governance to capture, but the foundation itself could be influenced. The non-profit structure provides some protection against hostile capture but decision-making remains centralized. [1]	2
GO-05	How are upgrades and changes to the protocol or project proposed and executed?Upgrades are made by the GE development team. No formal proposal process, no community voting, no time-locks. The open-source nature means changes are visible on GitHub, but execution is controlled by the core team. [1]	2
GO-06	Is there a separation between governance over monetary policy and governance over operational decisions?No formal separation. Individual communities set their own voucher parameters (a form of local monetary governance) but protocol-level decisions about infrastructure, standards, and policies are all made by the same GE team through the same informal process. [1][2]	2
GO-07	Does the project have a constitution, charter, or set of immutable principles?GE has a clear mission statement and philosophical framework around economic commons, commitment pooling, and community empowerment. Will Ruddick has published extensive writings on founding principles. However, these are not formalized as a constitution or immutable charter — they are informal values with no binding governance force. [1][2]	2
GO-08	Can the project's issuance rules be changed, and are monetary policy changes subject to stronger constraints than operational changes?Individual community voucher parameters (including expiration rates) are set in smart contracts, providing some immutability. However, the GE team can deploy new contract versions and modify platform-level parameters. No special governance constraints distinguish monetary policy changes from operational ones. Issuance rules changeable via the same informal process. [1][2]	2

Resilience

3.0

Code	Question	Score
RE-01	Has the project survived a major crisis or adversarial event?The system operated during COVID-19 lockdowns in Kenya (2020-2021), facilitating over $1M in trade among 30,000 users when the formal economy was shut down. The system also survived the transition from paper vouchers to digital (2017) and migration from xDAI to Celo (2023). Survived moderate-to-major stress; parameters adjusted but core mechanism held. [1][2]	4
RE-02	Does the project have redundancy in its critical infrastructure?Key components have single points of failure: the USSD gateway, custodial key management system, and Sarafu.Network frontend are all operated by GE. The Celo blockchain provides redundancy for on-chain data, but the access layer is centralized. Some redundancy but key components have single points of failure. [1][2]	3
RE-03	Can the project recover from a catastrophic failure?All code is open-source under AGPL-3.0, and on-chain data persists on Celo. A competent team could theoretically rebuild the system from public code and blockchain data. However, no documented disaster recovery plan exists, and community relationships/knowledge are held by the GE team. Partial recovery possible. [1][2]	3
RE-04	Is the project's design simple enough to be maintained and understood long-term?The core concept — communities issue vouchers backed by commitments, with demurrage and pool-based exchange — is elegant and describable on a single page. The software stack has moderate complexity (Go, TypeScript, Solidity, USSD integration) but the conceptual model is simple. Well-documented and modular. [1][2]	4
RE-05	Is the project dependent on a specific technology that could become obsolete?Built on EVM-compatible smart contracts, designed for portability across blockchains. Software docs emphasize "portability — abstractions enabling migration across different ledger systems." USSD is a mature, stable technology. Built on widely-supported stack with documented migration path. [1][2]	4
RE-06	How does the project handle economic stress (bank runs, liquidity crises, collateral crashes, inflation/deflation shocks)?The system demonstrated real performance during COVID-19 economic stress in Kenya. Demurrage prevents hoarding runs. Commitment backing means no collateral crash risk in the traditional sense. However, no formal stress testing or circuit breakers exist. The system relies on community trust — if trust erodes, voucher acceptance declines. Survived moderate stress but mechanisms are ad-hoc. [1][2]	3
RE-07	Does the project have sustainable funding for long-term maintenance?GE is a non-profit dependent on grants and donations. Partners include Red Cross, Celo Foundation, and various donors. No self-sustaining protocol fee model. Celo validator rewards cover gas fees but not operational costs. The project appears funded for ongoing operations but relies on continued grant funding. Funded for 1-3 years reliant on grants. [1][2]	2
RE-08	Can the system operate across extreme latency, disconnected networks, and multi-century timescales?USSD interface works without internet, which is a significant advantage for disconnected scenarios. The software docs emphasize "offline-first development — local transmission without internet dependency." The system can function with high latency through USSD and local transmission. Core protocol logic is latency-tolerant. [1][2]	4
RE-09	Is the system designed for a world where AI agents are primary economic actors?The system uses standard EVM smart contracts, which AI agents can interact with. However, the USSD interface is human-oriented, and community-level governance assumes human participants. The protocol was not specifically designed for machine participants but is accessible via standard interfaces. [1][2]	3

Inclusivity

4.2

Code	Question	Score
IN-01	Can anyone in the world participate regardless of nationality, wealth, or status?The system is accessible via basic feature phones (USSD), requiring no smartphone, internet, or bank account. No minimum balance, no nationality restriction, no credit check. Practical barriers exist (need a Kenyan phone number for USSD, or internet for web interface). Open to anyone in principle with minor practical barriers. [1][2]	4
IN-02	What is the minimum cost to start using the project?Zero cost to begin. No minimum balance required. Transaction fees are subsidized by Celo validator rewards. Users only need a basic phone with cellular service. The 2025 survey contrasts favorably with M-Pesa where 35% report fee-related challenges. [1][2]	5
IN-03	Does the project actively serve underbanked or financially excluded populations?Designed specifically for financially excluded populations. Deployed in underbanked communities across Kenya including rural areas, urban slums (Mukuru, Kibera), and refugee camps (Dadaab, Kalobeyei). 19% of surveyed users report no income. 80.9% do not receive aid. 71% female users. [1][2]	5
IN-04	Does the project distribute economic benefits — including seigniorage — broadly, or concentrate them among insiders?Economic benefits flow to community participants. Vouchers are created by communities for their own use — no insider allocation or VC extraction. Demurrage fees are redistributed into the ecosystem potentially funding UBI-like programs. GE operates as a non-profit. Benefits are broadly distributed with no insider advantage. [1][2]	4
IN-05	Does the project treat all participants equally under the same rules?Within a community voucher system, all participants operate under the same rules — same demurrage rate, same transaction capabilities. GE staff have admin access to the custodial system which creates a functional tier, but the monetary rules apply equally. Minor operational tiers exist but do not affect monetary policy. [1][2]	4
IN-06	Does the project require identity documentation or surveillance to participate?Registration requires a phone number (tied to SIM card, which in Kenya requires ID). No government KYC for core functionality. The USSD system collects phone numbers and basic info. Light identity requirement — phone number for onboarding but no government ID for core usage. [1][2]	3
IN-07	Does the project have mechanisms to prevent wealth concentration over time?Demurrage is an active anti-concentration mechanism — holding fees penalize hoarding and encourage circulation. Accumulated holding fees can be redistributed as UBI. The commitment-based issuance means wealth is created through productive activity, not capital accumulation. Active anti-concentration mechanisms structurally prevent wealth concentration. [1][2]	5

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Grassroots Economics and what problem does it solve?

How is money created in Grassroots Economics?

Communities can create their own vouchers via Sarafu.Network, but the process involves GE facilitation and training. Any community group can issue a voucher representing commitments to goods/services, making it semi-open with a rule-based permissioned set of issuers. 220 unique contracts published by individuals and groups.

How does Grassroots Economics maintain stable spending power?

There is no explicit price-targeting mechanism. However, supply is linked to real economic participation: vouchers are issued against commitments and reduced via demurrage. Supply expands with active participants and contracts with inactivity.

Is Grassroots Economics independent from fiat currencies?

Each community voucher is its own unit of account, but values are commonly referenced in Kenyan Shilling equivalents. The Bangla-Pesa was "pegged to the Kenyan Shilling but not convertible to it." The system has its own units (each voucher) but bootstraps with fiat reference.

Who controls Grassroots Economics and can it be shut down?

Grassroots Economics Foundation controls critical infrastructure including the custodial key management system, USSD gateway, and Sarafu.Network frontend. While smart contracts on Celo are persistent, the custodial layer and USSD interface are centralized. The GE foundation or Kenyan government could disrupt operations.

How widely adopted is Grassroots Economics today?

4,476 active users as of July 2025 on the current Celo-based system. Historically up to 55,000 users across previous iterations (2020-2021). Current active user count places it in the 1K-10K range.

Is Grassroots Economics still active and growing?

Fully active and growing. The 2025 survey shows 4,476 active users, 251,449 peer-to-peer exchanges, 561 vouchers, and 55 pools. Active development on GitHub (107 repos, commits as recent as April 2026).

What are the main risks or weaknesses of Grassroots Economics?

Weakest category: Governance (2.1).

What makes Grassroots Economics unique from an M69 perspective?

Strongest category: Inclusivity (4.2).

How is Grassroots Economics's M69 Score calculated?

Grassroots Economics scores 3.3/5.0 overall. Pillar scores: Monetary Sovereignty 3.3, Civilizational Durability 2.5, Universal Adoption 3.9. Strongest: Inclusivity (4.2). Weakest: Governance (2.1).