Aave GHO

Raw category average 2.6, rounded to 3. IM-01 3: any user can mint by locking collateral, but the facilitator set that may issue is whitelisted by DAO vote. IM-02 1: GHO is minted only by borrowing, so every unit is a debt. IM-03 2: backing is crypto-native collateral on Aave with no real-economy signal. IM-04 3: per-facilitator bucket caps, adjustable by governance. IM-05 4: supply burns permissionlessly on repayment.

Weighted 3.1. SPS-01 3: peg held by borrow-rate policy plus a stability module that swaps USDC/USDT at 1:1, reactive rather than continuous. SPS-02 2: the benchmark is the US dollar. SPS-03 4: fully on-chain and auditable. SPS-04 3: traded meaningfully below peg through much of its first year and has held near 1.00 since; DefiLlama price read 0.9976 on 2026-08-07. SPS-05 3: targets the daily peg only. SPS-06 5: on-chain access is the same everywhere.

Weighted 2.4. FI-01 1: hard 1:1 USD peg. FI-02 3: collateral is mostly crypto-native but fiat-backed stablecoins are both accepted collateral and the stability module's reserve. FI-03 5: no banking relationship needed. FI-04 2: dollar-denominated feeds from decentralised oracles. FI-05 2: a dollar failure would impair it with only a theoretical recovery path. FI-06 2: the peg is treated as permanent. FI-07 2: no local-currency composability by design. FI-08 3: bridges and DEXs only, no monetary interoperability standard.

Weighted 2.8. TR-01 5 and TR-10 4: circulating supply 697.3M USD on 2026-08-07 per DefiLlama, up from the 637M the M69 intel brief recorded in early August. TR-02 3: live since 2023. TR-03 2: no verified active-holder figure was found this run, so scored conservatively. TR-04 1: no merchant acceptance. TR-05 2: always quoted as a dollar equivalent. TR-06 5 and TR-07 4: Aave Labs and the DAO are active and the integration set is wide. TR-08 4: Wikipedia, DefiLlama and mainstream crypto press. TR-09 3: sGHO yield and staker borrow discounts do real work. TR-11 3: a strong protocol brand around a financially motivated holder base.

Weighted 3.5, rounded to 4. SO-01 3: the DAO can disable facilitators but cannot seize outstanding GHO. SO-02 4 and SO-09 4: contracts are open source, on-chain and change only through timelocked votes. SO-04 5: non-custodial. SO-05 4: contributor base is broad. SO-06 3: depends on Ethereum and Chainlink. SO-07 4: no freeze function in the token itself. SO-08 3: pseudonymous, fully public ledger.

Weighted 3.7, rounded to 4. GO-01 5 and GO-03 5: the ARFC and AIP process is documented and every vote is on-chain. GO-02 3: AAVE voting weight is concentrated. GO-04 3: capture is expensive but possible. GO-05 4: timelocked execution. GO-06 4: risk stewards hold bounded parameter powers separate from full proposals. GO-07 3: principles are documented, not entrenched. GO-08 3: mint caps change through the ordinary proposal route.

Weighted 3.6, rounded to 4. RE-01 4: the Aave money market has come through several market-wide crises without mechanism failure, and GHO itself recovered from its early discount without a redesign. RE-02 4: multiple front ends and decentralised oracles. RE-03 5: rebuildable from public code and chain data. RE-04 3: the facilitator and stability-module design is not simple. RE-06 4: liquidations, supply caps and the stability module have run live through volatile markets. RE-07 5: DAO treasury and protocol revenue. RE-08 2: needs low-latency L1 consensus. RE-09 4: fully programmable for machine actors.

Weighted 3.3. IN-01 4: a wallet is the only requirement. IN-02 3: Ethereum gas is a real barrier, Monad much less so. IN-03 2: not built for underbanked users. IN-04 3: borrow interest accrues to the DAO treasury and AAVE stakers. IN-05 3: staker discounts create a tier. IN-06 5: no identity check. IN-07 2: sGHO yield pays in proportion to holdings.